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under Perfect and 
Imperfect Competition 
Jerry A. Hausman 
The economic theory of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been well devel- 
oped (see, e.g., Pollak 1989). The CPI serves as an approximation of an ideal 
cost-of-living (COL) index. In turn, the COL index answers the question of 
how  much more (or less) income a consumer requires to be as well-off in 
period 1 as in period 0 given changes in prices, changes in the quality of goods, 
and the introduction of  new goods (or the disappearance of existing goods). 
The CPI as currently estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) does 
a reasonable job of  accounting for price changes and has begun to attempt 
to include quality changes. However, the BLS has not attempted to estimate 
the effect of the introduction of new goods, despite the recognition of the po- 
tential importance of new goods on both a COL index and the CPI (see Fixler 
1993). 
The omission of  the effect of  the introduction of  new  goods seems quite 
surprising given that most commonly used business strategies can be placed in 
either of two categories: becoming the low-cost producer of a homogeneous 
good or differentiating your product from its competitors. The latter strategy 
has become the hallmark of much of American (and Japanese) business prac- 
tice. The numbers of cars, beers, cereals, sodas, ice creams and yogurts, appli- 
ances such as refrigerators, and cable television programs all demonstrate the 
ability of  firms to differentiate their products successfully. Furthermore, con- 
sumers demonstrate a preference for these products by  buying them in suffi- 
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cient quantities to make the expected profit positive for the new brands. As the 
BLS has recognized in its estimation of the CPI: “If the measurement error is 
systematic, then a systematic difference may exist between the computed CPI 
and the true [COL index], which would, in turn, affect the measured rate of 
price change” (Fixler 1993,3). This paper finds evidence of such a systematic 
difference which causes the CPI to be overstated by a significant amount due 
to its neglect of new products.’ 
In this paper I first explain the theory of COL indexes and demonstrate how 
new goods should be included, using the classical theory of Hicks (1940) and 
Rothbarth (1941). The correct price to use for the good in the preintroduction 
period  is the “virtual” price which  sets demand to zero. Estimation of  this 
virtual price requires estimation of a demand function which in turn provides 
the expenditure function which allows exact calculation of the COL index. The 
extensive  data requirements  and the need to specify and estimate a demand 
function for a new brand among many existing brands may have proved obsta- 
cles to the inclusion of new goods in the CPI up to this point. 
As an example I use the introduction of a new cereal brand by General Mills 
in 1989-Apple-Cinnamon  Cheerios. The cereal industry has been among the 
most prodigious in new-brand introduction. My econometric specification per- 
mits differing amounts of  similarity among cereal brands, which is quite im- 
portant  given  that  Apple-Cinnamon  Cheerios  are  closer  to  other  Cheerios 
brands than to, say, Shredded Wheat. I find that the virtual price is about twice 
the actual price of Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios and that the increase in consum- 
er’s surplus is substantial. Based on some simplifying approximations, I find 
that the CPI may be overstated for cereal by about 25 percent because of  its 
neglect of the effect of new cereal brands. 
I then extend the classical Hicks-Rothbarth theory from its implicit assump- 
tion of perfect competition to the more realistic situation of imperfect competi- 
tion among multiproduct firms. Imperfect competition  can be important be- 
cause introduction of a new brand may allow a multiproduct firm to raise the 
prices of its existing, closely competing brands. When I take account of the 
effect of imperfect competition, I find that the increase in consumer welfare is 
only 85 percent as high as in the perfect competition case. Nevertheless, the 
CPI for cereal would still be too high by about 20 percent. Thus, I conclude 
that the introduction of new goods is an important economic occurrence, and 
the BLS should attempt to develop procedures to incorporate new goods cor- 
rectly into the CPI. I also find that consumers highly value new goods, which 
provide  significant consumer’s surplus despite the existence of  other brands 
which compete closely with the new brand. 
1. The BLS does include new goods after they are introduced. However, this procedure misses 
the additional consumer welfare which arises from the introduction of the new good compared to 
the welfare in the base period when the good was not being sold. 211  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
5.1  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect Competition 
Sir John Hicks made one of  the first attempts to develop the theory of the 
evaluation of new goods. In 1940  Hicks considered evaluation of social income 
and economic welfare, using index number theory to consider the effects of 
rationing and the introduction of new goods. Hicks correctly saw his approach 
as the basis for the evaluation of real income under these changes. Without 
completely working out the mathematics, Hicks stated that for rationed goods 
the index numbers need to be altered so that the price used would lead to the 
amount of the ration. This higher price can be considered the “virtual price” 
which, when inserted into the demand function, leads to the observed amount 
of  rationed demand.* For new products Hicks stated that the virtual price for 
periods in which the goods did not exist would “just make the demands for 
these commodities (from the whole community) equal to zero” (1940,  144). 
Modern economists recognize this price as the  shadow or reservation  price 
which, used in the demand function, sets demand equal to zero. Of course, 
new products in a sense are a special case of rationing where the demand for 
the good is zero. Given the demand function I can solve for the virtual price 
and for the expenditure (or indirect utility) function and do correct evaluations 
of social welfare without needing to use the index number formulas discussed 
by Hicks.3 
Rothbarth, in a 1941 paper on rationing, put the subject on a firm mathemati- 
cal footing and introduced the notion that a virtual price arises from the “price 
system with respect to which the quantities actually consumed are optimum 
. . . the  ‘virtual price system”’  I use his approach to demonstrate the 
effect on the price index, or real income, of the introduction of a new good. In 
period 1 consider the demand for the new good, x,  ,  as a function of all prices 
and income, y: 
Now if  the good was not available in period 0, I solve for the virtual price, 
p,*, which causes the demand for the new good to be equal to zero: 
2. See Neary and Roberts (1980) for a modem treatment of rationing using this approach. 
3. See Hausman (1980, 1981) who uses this approach in the context of female labor supply to 
do welfare calculations. 
4. Rothbarth, one of  Keynes’s last students, faced internment in the United Kingdom during 
World War  I1 because of  his German nationality. Instead, he volunteered for the British army 
where he died during the war. G.  Burtless and I (Burtless and Hausman  1978) were unaware of 
Rothbarth’s paper when we used the term “virtual income” in solving for demands in nonlinear 
budget set problems. Rothbarth’s paper was subsequently pointed out to us by  K. Roberts. 212  Jerry A. Hausman 
The index  number  approach,  used  by  both  Hicks  (1940) and  Rothbarth 
(1941), then considers the change in real income to be the ratio (p,*)(x,)  / 
(p,,)(xn).  While this approach is approximately correct, it does not account 
for the need to change income y as the price is increased in order to stay on 
the same indifference curve and thus keep the marginal value of income con- 
stant. Thus, instead of using the Marshallian demand curve in equations (1) 
and (2), I use the income-compensated and utility-constant Hicksian demand 
curve to do an exact welfare e~aluation.~  In terms of the expenditure function 
I solve the differential equation from Roy’s identity, which corresponds to the 
demand function in equation (l), to find the (partial) expenditure function6 
(3)  Y  = 4p,,  . . . ,  p,-’,  pn,  u’). 
The expenditure function gives the minimum amount of  income, y, to achieve 
the level of utility, u’, that arises from the indirect utility function correspond- 
ing to the demand function of equation (1) and to the expenditure function of 
equation (3). To solve for the amount of income needed to achieve utility level 
u’ in the absence of the new good, I use the expenditure function from equation 
(3) to calculate 
The exact COL index becomes P(p,  p*, u’) = y* / y. Note that to use this 
approach one must estimate a demand curve as in equation (l),  which in turn 
implies the expenditure function and the ability to do the exact welfare calcula- 
tion of equations (3) and (4). Thus, the only assumption which is required is 
to specify a parametric (or nonparametric) form of the demand function. 
Diewert (1992) reviews the price index literature and calls the use of the 
expenditure (or cost) function approach the “economic approach,” which he 
relates back to the original paper of Koniis (1939) and compares to the “axiom- 
atic approach,” which is more often used in the price index literature. Diewert 
recognizes the usefulness of the economic approach, but he notes the require- 
ment of knowing the consumer’s expenditure function (1992, 18). In the case 
of new goods the traditional axiomatic approach offers little or no guidance 
so that demand curve estimation must be undertaken to estimate the virtual or 
reservation price. Once the demand curve is estimated, the expenditure func- 
tion comes for “free,” since no additional assumptions are required and new 
5. In equation  (Z),  income, y,  is solved in terms of  the utility level, ul,  to find the Hicksian 
demand curve given the Marshallian demand curve specification. Hausman (198  1) demonstrates 
this solution procedure. 
6.  Hausman (1981)  demonstrates how to solve the differential equation which arises from Roy’s 
identity in the case of common parametric specifications of demand. Hausman and Newey (1995) 
demonstrate how to do the analysis when a nonparametric specification of  demand is specified 
and estimated. 213  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
goods can be evaluated.’ Thus, the economic approach seems to be the only 
practical approach to the evaluation of new goods. 
A potentially more serious problem with the valuation of new goods is the 
implicit assumption of perfect competition. Indeed, I have not seen this poten- 
tial problem mentioned  in my  review of  the literature although Robinson’s 
(1933) book on imperfect competition predates Hicks’s (1940) paper. The im- 
plicit  assumption of  perfect competition follows from the assumption that 
prices of other goods remain the same at marginal cost when the new good is 
introduced. Under imperfect competition with significant fixed costs and free 
entry which leads to a zero-profit condition, introduction of  a new  good will 
lead to somewhat higher prices for existing goods whose demand decreases. 
This effect will usually be small. A more significant effect arises from the fact 
that most new products are introduced by multiproduct firms. Introduction of 
a new good will allow the firm to raise its price because some of the demand 
for its existing product, which it will lose, will not go to competitors’ products, 
but will instead go to the firm’s new product. I will develop the implications of 
imperfect competition in section 5.6, but first I will apply the classical theory 
of new products under perfect competition to data from the ready-to-eat cereal 
industry, perhaps the foremost industry in the introduction of new goods. 
5.2  New-Product Introductions in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry 
The ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry has been among the most prodigious 
introducers of new brands in U.S. industries.*  In the period 1980-92  approxi- 
mately  190 new brands were introduced into a pool of  about  160 existing 
brands. Most new cereal brands, in common with most new-product introduc- 
tions, do not s~cceed.~  Out of the 190 new brands introduced since 1980, over 
95 have been discontinued. For instance, of the 27 new brands introduced in 
1989, 14 brands had already been discontinued by  1993. Of  the  190 new 
brands introduced during the twelve-year period, only 2 of the 190 brands have 
a market share (in pounds) of  greater than  1 percent. Still, new  brands are 
important in the sense that about 25 percent of  all RTE cereal consumption 
comes from brands introduced within the past ten years. Thus, cereal company 
executives believe that it is quite important to continue to introduce new brands 
7. Confusion sometimes arises over  whether the entire expenditure  function or  all demand 
curves must be estimated. The answer is no under the usual type of separability assumptions (or 
Leontief aggregation assumptions) which are commonly used in empirical research and are im- 
plicit in statistical agencies’ calculations of  price indexes. Thus, only the demand curve for the 
new good needs to be estimated, not the demand curve for all other goods. 
8. Recently, the beer industry has also undergone significant new-product introductions with 
bottled draft beers, dry beers, and ice beers, all introduced within about the past five years. 
9. About 80 percent of  new-product introductions in consumer goods fail. See, e.g., Urban et 
al. (1983). 214  Jerry A. Hausman 
because consumers exhibit a strong preference for continued variety  among 
cereal brands. 
Some economists  have claimed that this high rate of  introduction of  new 
brands is part of an anticompetitive strategy by cereal companies.1° While both 
economic theory and the facts of the industry seem contrary to the preemption 
claim, the RTE cereal industry is highly concentrated with no successful entry 
by  a significant manufacturer in the past fifty years. Six firms have each pro- 
duced 94 percent or more of all RTE cereals (in dollar sales) over the period 
1982-92. Kellogg’s share has varied in the range of 37.3-41.5  percent; General 
Mills’ share has varied from 23.0 to 29.0 percent; General Foods’ share has 
varied in the range of  10.4-15.8  percent. Quaker, Ralston, and Nabisco have 
all been in the range of about 3.0-8.9  percent. Only one other company, Malt- 
0-Meal, has gained a share above 1 percent.” Recently, a move toward further 
consolidation has occurred. In  1992 General Mills announced a purchase of 
Nabisco’s cereal brands, the largest of which is Nabisco Shredded Wheat. The 
US. government granted permission for this acquisition, and in 1993 General 
Foods (Post brands) acquired Nabisco’s cereal brands. Thus, five major firms 
are likely to exist, although  I  would not be  surprised if  another acquisition 
occurred soon.12 
However, while the three largest firms have about 80 percent of  the RTE 
cereal market, it is important to realize that very few individual brands have 
significant shares. For instance, Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes is the largest Kellogg 
brand, with a share of  5.0 percent (in 1993); Kellogg’s Corn Flakes is quite 
close at 4.99 percent, while Cheerios is the largest General Mills brand, with 
a share of  5.3 percent. Most brands have quite a small share and the  share 
movement among brands is quite dynamic. 
No successful entry by a significant new manufacturer has occurred in the 
RTE cereal  industry in  the  past  fifty years. The RTE industry ha remained 
highly concentrated during this time period, despite the general perception that 
investments in the RTE cereal industry earn higher rates of return than in many 
other indu~tries.’~  During the  1970s, some new entry did occur in the RTE 
10. See Schmalensee (1978)  and Scherer (1982) who claim that “brand proliferation” served as 
an entry deterrent in the RTE cereal industry. Both economists testified for the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) “In the matter of  Kellogg  Co. et al.;’  (docket no. 8883, available  from the 
author). The FTC lost this “shared monopoly” case in which it was claimed that a highly concen- 
trated oligopoly deterred entry through the introduction of new brands. Furthermore, Judd (1985) 
subsequently demonstrated that the preemption story implied by brand proliferation is unlikely to 
provide credible preemption unless exit costs are high, which is contrary to fact in the RTE cereal 
industry for a given brand. 
11. However, no individual brand of Malt-0-Meal  has ever achieved  1 percent. Furthermore, 
much of Malt-0-Meal’s production is for private-label  brands. 
12. The State of New York is currently challenging General Foods’ acquisition of Nabisco, so 
an extremely small probability exists that  Nabisco may  become independent again, raising the 
number of competitors to six. 
13. See, c.g., General Mills’ 1992 annual report, p. 2, which reports an average after-tax return 
on capital over five years of  21 percent, “which is among the best in U.S. industry”; Kellogg’s 
1991 annual report, p.  16, gives an after-tax return on assets of about 15.5 percent for 1991, while 215  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
cereals industry  for “natural”  cereals and by  some substantial  food-product 
manufacturers such as Pillsbury, Pet, and Colgate, but these firms did not last 
long as competitors. Thus, the prospect for actual new entry into the RTE ce- 
real industry is very unlikely, with exit a more likely prospect than new entry. 
This is despite high growth rates in the 1982-92  period, when average revenue 
growth was 6.7 percent per year (in real terms). 
Since the brand-proliferation models do not yield a credible model of  entry 
deterrence, what is the main reason for the lack of new entry into an industry 
which otherwise might expect significant new entry? The main impediment to 
successful new entry into the RTE cereal market is the necessity for an ex- 
tremely large investment in advertising, all of which is a sunk cost if the new 
product does not ~ucceed.’~  Industry estimates are that for firms to launch a 
new brand currently costs $20-40  million for advertising and promotion in the 
initial year. The investment is typically continued at this level annually for one 
to two years, unless the brand is discontinued or allowed to decline because of 
a decision that it will not succeed in the long run. The cumulative investment 
is expected to be paid off (before any net positive return to the investment is 
obtained) only after a period of one to two years, although a very few brands 
do succeed more quickly. This investment is substantial compared to the likely 
success-a  1 percent share for a new brand is considered to be a great success. 
Yet almost no new brand achieves  1 percent. Of the approximately  190 new 
brands  which  were  introduced  during  1982-92,  only  two currently  have  a 
pound share of 1 percent or greater. 
Thus, the odds of a successful new-brand introduction by an existing RTE 
manufacturer are daunting; a new entrant would face even longer odds because 
of start-up costs and the extra cost and difficulty of achieving shelf space for a 
new  brand. An  existing  manufacturer  can transfer  shelf  space from an  old 
brand to a new brand. However, a new entrant does not have the shelf space to 
trade. The main “outside” competition which has arisen over the past few years 
has been  the  success  of  “store  brands,”  also called private-label   brand^.'^ 
Private-label brands have doubled their market share from about 4 percent to 
8 percent  over the past  five to ten years.  For these brands the supermarket 
provides the shelf space and has the cereal manufactured  independently. In- 
deed, Ralston  does the  majority  of  the private-brand  manufacturing.  Thus 
private-label corn flakes and other brands seem most successful in providing 
Kellogg’s second-quarter report for the first six months of  1992 yields an annualized return on 
assets of  17.7 percent (financial reports available from the author). Of  course, accounting returns 
on assets are typically an unreliable guide to economic returns; nevertheless, the cereal industry is 
widely perceived to be quite profitable. 
14. Sutton (1991) analyzes a model where endogenous advertising costs provide the main bar- 
rier to entry in the RTE cereal industry. 
15. Sutton (1991), in his analysis of competition in the cereal industry, finds only limited compe- 
tition from private-label brands, which seems contrary to recent developments within the RTE 
cereal industry. 216  Jerry A. Hausman 
competition by  doing the  opposite of  the brand-proliferation  model.lh The 
private-label brands do little advertising and position themselves identically to 
existing brands, while offering a lower price to consumers and a higher profit 
margin to the stores. This success of  the private-label brands provides limited 
support for the theory that large sunk costs of advertising provide the primary 
barrier to entry into the cereal industry. 
Thus, the high rate of new-brand introduction is not part of an anticompeti- 
tive strategy in my view. Still, many economists might well doubt the social 
value of these new brands, the vast majority of which do not succeed. To con- 
centrate the debate, I consider the value to consumers of  the introduction of 
Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios by General Mills in 1989. I choose this brand be- 
cause it is close to existing General Mills brands-Cheerios  is the largest Gen- 
eral Mills brand and Honey-Nut Cheerios are well established in the market. 
Thus, there  is certainly  an  empirical question  of  whether consumers place 
much value on the new brand or whether it is already spanned by  existing 
brands and so creates very little new value to consumers. 
5.3  An Empirical Model of Brand Choice in the RTE Cereal Industry 
I now proceed to estimate an empirical model of brand choice using a three- 
level model of demand. The top level is the overall demand for cereal using a 
price index for cereal relative to other goods. The middle level of the demand 
system estimates demand among various market segments, for example, the 
adult or the child segments. The bottom level is the choice of brand, for ex- 
ample, Cheerios, conditional on a given segment’s expenditure. Overall price 
elasticities are then derived from the estimates in all three segments. While this 
demand  structure places  restrictions  on  the  overall  pattern  of  substitution 
across brands, it is considerably less restrictive than other demand approaches 
typically  used  to estimate the demand  for differentiated  products.  Clearly, 
some restrictions are required given the more than one hundred brands of ce- 
real available in the marketplace. The approach also allows for convenient tests 
of the overall specification of brand segments within the model (see Hausman, 
Leonard, and Zona 1994 for the testing methodology). 
The data used to estimate the model are cash-register data collected on a 
weekly basis  across  a sample of  stores in  major  metropolitan  areas of  the 
United States over a two-year period. Thus, exact price and quantity data are 
available, with considerable price variation due to promotions and coupons. 
The panel structure of the data-approximately  140 time series observations 
on each brand across seven standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs)- 
16. Economists for the FTC also claimed that entry was difficult due to the economies of scale 
in  cereal manufacturing which would require an entrant to have several successful brands. They 
failed to consider contract manufacturing of the type done by Ralston for private-label brands. 217  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
allows for quite precise estimation. The panel data also permits identification 
and instrumental variable (IV) estimation under relatively weak assumptions. 
Thus, the estimated demand structure should allow a precise estimate of the 
virtual price for a new cereal brand. 
In terms of actual estimation I estimate the model in reverse order, beginning 
at the lowest level, and then use the theory of price indexes to allow for consis- 
tent estimation at the higher (more aggregate) levels of demand. The third (or 
lowest) stage determines buying behavior within market segments. I use this 
approach because it accords with segmentation of brand-purchasing behavior, 
which marketing analysts claim arises with purchasing behavior, and because 
it limits the number of cross elasticities which will be estimated. My econo- 
metric specification at the lowest level is the “almost-ideal demand system” of 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1980b) which allows for a second-order flex- 
ible demand system, that is, the price elasticities are unconstrained at the point 
of approximation, and also allows for a convenient specification for nonhomo- 
thetic behavior. However, my experience is that the particular form of the de- 
mand specification is not crucial here. Use of a flexible demand system allows 
for few restrictions on preferences, while decreasing the number of unknown 
parameters through the use of symmetry and adding up restrictions from con- 
sumer theory. For each brand within the market segment the demand specifi- 
cation is 
where sin, is the revenue share of total segment expenditure of  the ith brand in 
city n in period t,  ycnr  is overall segment expenditure, P,, is a price index, and 
pi,, is the price of  thejth brand in city n.  Note that a test of whether  Pi = 0 
allows for a test of segment homotheticity,  for example, whether shares are 
independent of segment expenditure. The estimated yij  permit a free pattern of 
cross-price elasticities, and Slutsky symmetry can be imposed, if desired, by 
setting yij = yji  . This choice of  the bottom-level demand specification does 
not impose any restrictions on competition among brands within a given seg- 
ment.  In  particular,  no equal cross  elasticity-type  assumptions  restrict  the 
within-segment  cross-price elasticities. Since competition  among differenti- 
ated products is typically “highest” among brands within a given segment, this 
lack of restrictions can be an important feature of the model. An important 
econometric consideration is the use of segment expenditure, yGnr,  in the share 
specification of equation (5),  rather than the use of overall expenditure. Use 
of overall expenditure is inconsistent with the economic theory of multistage 
budgeting, and it can lead to decidedly inferior econometric results. 
Given the estimates from equation  (5),  I calculate a price index for each 
segment and proceed to estimate the next level of demand. For exact two-stage 218  Jerry A. Hausman 
budgeting, the Gorman results impose the requirement of additive separability 
on the next le~e1.I~  To specify the middle-level demand system I use the log- 
log demand system:1x 
k 
log q,,,,  = P,,  1%  YBn, + c 6,  1%  Tk,,, + amn + Emn,; 
A=  I  (6) 
m=l,  ...,  M;  n=l,  ...,  N;  t=l,  ...,  T; 
where the left-hand-side variable q,,,,  is the log quantity of the mth segment in 
city n in period t, the expenditure variable yRnr  is total cereal expenditure, and 
the rkn,  are the segment price indexes for city n. The segments that I use are 
the adult segment which includes brands such as Shredded Wheat and Grape 
Nuts,  the  child  segment  which  includes  Kix  and  sugar-coated cereals,  and 
the family segment which includes Cheerios, Corn Flakes, and other similar 
brands. The price indexes r,,?,  can be estimated either by using an exact price 
index corresponding to equation (5),  which is constructed from the expendi- 
ture function for each segment holding utility constant, or by using a weighted- 
average price index of the Stone-Laspeyres type. Choice of the exact form of 
the price index does not typically have much influence on the final model esti- 
mates. 
Lastly, the top-level equation, which I use to estimate the overall price elas- 
ticity of cereal, is specified as 
(7)  log u, = p,  + p, log y, + pz  log rr, + Z,6  + El, 
where u, is the overall consumption of cereal, y,  is deflated disposable income, 
n,  is the deflated price index for cereal, and Z, are variables which account for 
changes in demographics and monthly (seasonal) factors. To estimate equation 
(7) I use national (BLS) monthly data over a sixteen-year period with instru- 
mental variables. I have found that a longer time period than may be available 
from store-level data is often useful to estimate the top-level demand elasticity. 
The instruments I use in estimation  of equation  (7) are factors which shift 
costs such as different ingredients, packaging, and labor. 
I now consider the question of identification and consistent estimation of the 
middle-level and bottom-level equations. The problem is most easily seen in 
equation (5),  the brand-level equation, although an analogous problem arises 
in equation (6), the segment-level demand equation. Equation  (5)  for each 
brand will have a number of  prices included for each brand in the segment; 
for example, I include nine brands in the family segment in the subsequent 
17. See Gorman (1971). This  subject  is  also discussed  in  Blackorby, Primont, and Russell 
(1  978), and in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b). Note that the almost-ideal demand system is a 
generalized Gorman polar form (GGPF) so that Gorman's theorem on exact two-stage budgeting 
applies. Since the additive demand specification at the top level imposes separability restrictions, 
I have also used a less restrictive specification at the middle level which is not necessarily consis- 
tent with exact two-stage budgeting. The results are quite similar. 
18. Note that this specification is second-order flexible. However, the Slutsky restrictions have 
not been imposed on the specification. 219  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
estimation. It may be difficult to implement the usual strategy of estimating 
demand equations where the cost function  includes factor-input prices (e.g., 
material prices), which are excluded from the demand equations to allow for 
identification and for the application of instrumental variables. There may be 
an insufficient number of input prices, or they may not be reported with high 
enough frequency to allow for IV estimation. To help solve this problem, I 
exploit the panel structure of my data. For instance, suppose N  = 2, so that 
weekly or monthly data from two cities is available. Note that I have included 
brand (or segment) and city fixed effects in the specification of equations (5) 
and (6).  Now suppose I can model the price for a brand i in city n in period t as 
where p,,,  is the price for brand j in city n in period t. The determinants of  the 
brand price for brand j are c,,, the cost which is assumed not to have a city- 
specific time-shifting component (which is consistent with the national ship- 
ments and advertising of most differentiated products); ofn, which is a city- 
specific brand differential that accounts for transportation costs or local wage 
differentials;  and w,,,,,  which is a mean  zero stochastic  disturbance that ac- 
counts for sales promotions for brand j in city n in time period t. The specific 
identifying  assumption  that  I  make is that  the w,,,  are independent  across 
cities.I9 Using fixed effects the city-specific components are eliminated, and I 
am basically applying the Hausman-Taylor (198  1) technique for instrumental 
variables in panel-data models.20  The idea is that prices in one city (after elimi- 
nation of city- and brand-specific effects) are driven by underlying costs, el,, 
which provide instrumental variables that are correlated with prices but uncor- 
related  with stochastic disturbances  in the demand equations.  For example, 
w,,,,  from equation (8) is uncorrelated  with .zll,  from equation (5)  when the 
cities are different, n # 1. Thus, the availability of panel data is a crucial factor 
which allows for estimation of all the own-price and cross-price brand elastic- 
ities. 
However, another interpretation can be given to equation (8) and the ques- 
tion of whether w,,,  from equation (8) is uncorrelated with E,~,  from equation 
(5).  To the extent that supermarkets set their prices p,,, under an assumption 
of  constant marginal  cost (in the short run) and do not alter their prices to 
equilibrate supply and demand in a given week, prices p,,, may be considered 
predetermined with respect to equation (5).  If prices can be treated as predeter- 
mined, then IV methods would not necessarily be needed. IV methods might 
still be required for the segment-expenditure  variable yGn,  in  equation  (5), 
however. The need for instruments under these hypotheses can be tested in a 
19. Note that w,",  are permitted to be correlated within a given city. 
20. See also Breusch, Mizon, and Schmidt (1989). With more than two cities, tests of  the as- 
sumptions can be done along the lines discussed in Hausman and Taylor (1981). 220  Jerry A. Hausman 
Table 5.1  Segmentation of the Brands 
Adult  Child  Family 
Shredded Wheat Squares  Trix  Cheerios 
Special K  Kix  Honey-Nut Cheerios 
Fruit Wheats  Frosted Flakes  Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios 
Shredded Wheat  Froot Loops  Corn Flakes 
Shredded Wheat & Bran  Raisin Bran (Kellogg) 
Spoon-Size Shredded Wheat  Rice Krispies 
Grape Nuts  Frosted Mini-Wheats 
Frosted Wheat Squares 
Raisin Bran (Post) 
standard procedure  using specification tests for instruments, as in  Hausman 
(1978). 
5.4  Data and Results 
The data used to estimate the empirical model of brand choice in the RTE 
cereal industry are panel data from Nielsen Scantrak. The time series consists 
of  137 weekly observations from January  1990 to August  1992.21  The cross 
section  is  from  seven  SMSAs, including  Boston,  Chicago,  Detroit,  Los 
Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. In each SMSA Niel- 
sen’s sample frame is a stratified random sample of  supermarkets which cap- 
tures the vast majority of  all cereal sold. The data are collected on a stock- 
keeping unit  (SKU) basis  so that the volume of  sales is recorded  for each 
package size of  each brand at an average weekly price. I aggregate the data 
across packages so that the quantity variable is weekly sales, in pounds, for 
each brand at a weekly average price per pound. 
The  empirical  specification  requires  specification  of  brand  segments.  I 
choose three brand segments which correspond to the segmentation commonly 
used in the cereal industry by marketing analysts.**  Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios 
is placed in the family segment. The other two segments used are adults’ cere- 
als and children’s cereals. Some common brands  which are placed  into the 
three segments are given in table 5.1. To estimate the model for Apple-Cin- 
namon Cheerios, I focus on the family segment. The family segment represents 
about 26.4 percent of sales in the RTE cereal market. 
To highlight further the family segment, I include some descriptive statistics 
21. Estimation was also undertaken using monthly, rather than weekly, data. The estimated elas- 
ticities based on monthly data are quite similar to the weekly-data estimates, although the precision 
of the estimates is lower. 
22. Some choice of  segmentation is required  to  apply the demand system discussed above. 
However, I have applied the tests of segmentation discussed in the last section with the specifica- 
tion used and it was not rejected by  the Hausman specification tests. 221  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 








































for the family segment in table 5.2. This table demonstrates the overall popu- 
larity of Cheerios-the  three brands have a 42.84 percent share of  the family 
segment, or about  an  11.3 percent  share  of  overall cereal sales.  However, 
Apple-Cinnamon  Cheerios has a 6.19 percent share of the family segment, or 
a  1.6 percent  share of overall cereal sales. Thus, the introduction  of Apple- 
Cinnamon Cheerios was quite successful by industry standards. 
I now turn to estimation of the bottom level of the demand system, which is 
brand choice for family-segment  brands. The results are shown in table 5.3, 
where fixed effects are used for each SMSA, along with expenditures in this 
segment, prices for each of the brands, and a display variable. Hausman-Taylor 
(1981) IV estimation is used along with an unrestricted variance matrix for the 
stochastic disturbances (seemingly unrelated regression). Note that own-price 
coefficient estimates are generally precisely estimated. Most of the cross-price 
effects are also of  the expected sign and are generally  precisely  estimated. 
Homotheticity of brand choice, which would be a zero coefficient on the ex- 
penditure variable, is rejected and not imposed. However, Slutsky symmetry is 
not rejected so it is imposed on the model specification. 
In table 5.4 I now turn to segment estimates with a similar model specifica- 
tion including SMSA effects, overall cereal expenditure, and Stone price in- 
dexes for each segment along with a display variable for that segment. Here 
the dependent variable is sales in pounds, so that I find that adults’ cereals have 
an expenditure elasticity less than unity, children’s cereals have an expenditure 
elasticity which exceeds unity, and family cereals are not different from unity. 
Segment own-price elasticities  are found to be  sizable, around  -2.0,  while 
segment cross-price elasticities are also found to be large and significant. Thus, 
overall I find significant competition across cereal brands. 
In table 5.5 I  calculate the conditional  elasticities for the family segment, 
where I condition on expenditure in this segment. Note that the three brands 
of Cheerios provide significant brand competition for each other, which is con- 
sistent with the “cannibalization” fears of brand managers. In table 5.6 I esti- 
mate overall brand elasticities for the family segment after I estimate the top Table 5.3  Estimates of Demand for Family Segment Brands (seemingly unrelated regression) 
Apple-  Frosted 
Honey-Nut  Cinnamon  Corn  Kellogg’s  Rice  Frosted  Wheat 
Cheerios  Cheerios  Cheerios  Flakes  Raisin Bran  Krispies  Mini-Wheats  Squares 
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-0.12861 
(0.00873) 
(0.00494)  (0.00708) 
0.03966  0.02135  -0.13658 
(0.00545)  (0.0038  I )  (0.00950) 
-0.00791  -0.141 95 
0.00779  0.00008  0.01208  -0.03206 
(O.OOl58)  (0.00107)  (0.00236)  (0.00202) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. 224  Jerry A. Hausman 
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-  1.82906 
Notes: Dependent variable is segment sales in pounds. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic 
standard errors. 
level of the demand specification. I estimate the overall price elasticity for RTE 
cereal from the top-level demand equation to be -0.90  (asymptotic standard 
error [ASE] = 0.10). 
Using these estimates I now calculate the virtual price for Apple-Cinnamon 
Cheerios as the price at which its market share is zero. I use two methods to 
calculate the virtual price in which I draw graphs of the conditional demand 
curves using predicted  values from the bottom-level segment of the demand 
model. The results vary  somewhat depending on the aggregation  technique 
chosen.23  The results are found in figures 5.1 and 5.2. The estimated virtual, or 
23. The first method uses the average of the right-hand-side variables for the demand function 
across all 959 observations to solve for the virtual price. The second method solves for the virtual 
prices of each of the 959 observations and the average of these prices is used. The results differ 
because of  the nonlinearity of the demand system specification used. Table 5.5  Conditional Elasticities for Family Segment of RTE Cereal 
Apple-  Frosted  Frosted 
Honey-Nut  Cinnamon  Kellogg’s  Rice  Mini-  Wheat  Post Raisin 





Kellogg’s Raisin Bran 
Rice Krispies 
Frosted Mini-Wheats 
Frosted Wheat Squares 
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Nore: Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors Table 5.6  Overall Elasticities for Family Segment of RTE Cereal 
Apple-  Frosted  Frosted 
Honey-Nut  Cinnamon  Kellogg’s  Rice  Mini-  Wheat  Post Raisin 





Kellogg’s Raisin Bran 
Rice Krispies 
Frosted Mini-Wheats 
Frosted Wheat Squares 
Post Raisin Bran 
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Fig. 5.1  Almost-ideal demand curve for Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios (method 1) 
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Fig. 5.2  Almost-ideal demand curve for Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios (method 2) 
reservation, prices vary across cities from about $6.00 to about $7.50. My best 
estimate of  the aggregate reservation  price is $7.14. The ASE of  the virtual- 
price estimate is $1.33, with the lower bound of an (approximate) 95 percent 
confidence  interval estimated at $4.75-35  percent greater than the average 
price of Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios. 228  Jerry A. Hausman 
Estimating  the  (exact) consumer’s surplus from the  relevant  expenditure 
functions, which is approximately equivalent to calculating the area under the 
demand curve to the average price of $3.48, yields an estimate of $32,268 on 
a per city, weekly  average. The ASE of the estimate  of  $32,268 is $3,384, 
which yields a precise estimate of the consumer-welfare measure.24 For the 
United States the annual consumer’s surplus is approximately $78.1 million 
from the introduction  of  a new  brand  of  cereal. This  amount equals about 
$0.3136 per person per year which is a sizable amount of consumer’s surplus. 
Note that the virtual price of about $7.00 is about twice the actual sales price 
of $3.50, which seems to be a reasonable estimate. Since the own-price elastic- 
ity is about -2.2,  the reservation price seems to be in about the correct range.25 
The estimate of the virtual price of  $7.14 depends on the behavior of the 
estimated demand curve at the vertical axis (zero quantity). While significant 
price variation is observed in the data, on the order of 50 percent, prices as 
high as the virtual price are not observed. However, a lower-bound estimate of 
the virtual price arises from constructing the supporting hyperplane (tangent) 
to the demand curve in figures 5.1 and 5.2 at the actual average price of $3.48 
and observing the implied virtual price. So long as the demand curve is convex, 
this approach provides a lower-bound estimate to the virtual price. Using this 
approach I find that the estimated lower-bound virtual  price  varies between 
about $5.55 and $5.94 with an ASE of about $0.15. Thus, using the estimated 
lower bound I find that the average lower-bound reservation price is about 65 
percent higher than the average price of $3.48. Thus, a significant amount of 
consumer’s surplus remains, even when a lower-bound estimate is used. 
Note that neglecting the effect of the new brand leads to an overstatement 
of the price index for cereal. If Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios is aggregated with 
Honey-Nut Cheerios so that they are considered  to be  a single brand,  little 
effect is found beyond the slightly lower price of the new brand in the esti- 
mated average price of the two types of Cheerios. As a simple example, assume 
contrary to fact that all of Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios’ share was taken from 
that of Honey-Nut Cheerios. Before the introduction of the new brand the price 
index would be about $4.60, while after its introduction the price index would 
be about $3.57, for a decrease of about 22 percent-a  sizable reduction within 
the family segment. The decrease in the price index for the family segment is 
from $3.10 to $2.88, a decrease of 7.1 percent. In the overall price index for 
cereal the effect would be a reduction of about 0.017 (or $0.052) which  is 
again significant. This estimate of about 1.7 percent would stay approximately 
24. These  exact welfare  estimates  and  ASEs  use  the method  developed by  Hausman  and 
Newey (1995). 
25. Use of this same estimation technique for other highly differentiated products often leads 
to significantly higher estimated elasticities. For instance, in Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) 
we estimate own-price elasticities for brands of  beer, e.g.,  Budweiser, Miller, and Miller Lite, in 
the rage  of about -4.0  to -6.2.  Thus, the data source and estimation technique do not seem to 
lead to too-small elasticity estimates. 229  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
the same when the assumption is relaxed that Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios takes 
all its share from Honey-Nut Cheerios. The approximate change in the price 
index can be calculated by  taking Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios’ share of  about 
1.6 percent and multiplying by the difference between the virtual price (about 
$7.00) and the actual price (about $3.50). The results will differ depending on 
price differences between Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios and the brands it takes 
share away from. If  all brands had the same price the overall change in the 
price index would be about I .5 percent, or approximately the share of the new 
brand. Thus, to the extent that about 25 percent of cereal demand was from 
new brands over the past ten years, and under the (perhaps unrealistic) assump- 
tions that the new  brands sell for about the same average price as existing 
brands and that the estimate here would generalize to a reservation price of 
about two times the actual price, the overall price index for cereals which ex- 
cludes the effects of new brands would be too high by about the overall share 
of new brands-25  percent.26 
5.5  Alternative Model Specifications for New-Brand Introduction 
An  alternative model of  brand choice is the Hotelling-Gorman-Lancaster 
model of brand choice by attributes. Here a product, such as a car, is described 
by  its  attributes,  for  example,  size,  weight,  and  features  such  as  air- 
conditioning.*’  A discrete-choice model, either a logit model or probit model, 
is estimated and the demand for new brands is predicted as a function of the 
attributes. In distinct contrast to these attribute models, I describe each brand 
uniquely by an indicator (dummy) variable. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive 
how I would describe Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios in terms of  its attributes- 
perhaps the volume of  apples and cinnamon along  with other ingredients. 
Thus,  it  is  readily  recognized that  for  highly  differentiated products,  the 
discrete-choice model specification based on product attributes may  not be 
usable.**  Many economists find appealing the notion of  “distance” incorpo- 
rated in the attribute model. However, it is clear that no reasonable metric ex- 
ists to describe “how close” attributes are; and, moreover, no aggregator across 
attributes exists. The commonly used assumptions of linearity seem ad hoc at 
best. Instead, the appropriate measure of distance between two goods is really 
26. This estimate is too high to the extent that the exit of existing brands decreases consumer’s 
surplus for consumers still buying those brands. However, cereal brands are typically removed 
only when their market shares become extremely small because of the significant margins between 
price and marginal cost. Thus, the loss in consumer’s surplus due to exit will be extremely small. 
However, I cannot estimate this decrease in consumer’s surplus due to lack of data. 
27. An empirical specification of this model applied to new brands is given by Pakes, Berry, 
and Levinsohn (1993). 
28. While I have often applied probit models to brand choice (see Hausman and Wise 1978), I 
realized the limitation of these models when I tried applying them to the choices among French 
champagnes. Somehow, the bubble content could never be made to come in significant in  the 
probit specifications. 230  Jerry A. Hausman 
their cross-price  elasticities, which relate to what extent consumers find the 
two  goods to  be  close  substitutes.  Furthermore,  the  usual  discrete-choice 
model  used,  the logit model,  suffers from the well-known  independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) problem. The IIA problem typically leads to a vast 
overestimate of  the consumer’s surplus from a new  good because the model 
does not  incorporate  sufficiently the similarities to existing  goods. Alterna- 
tively, the cross-price elasticities of all goods with a given good are equal; see, 
for example, Hausman ( 1975). A more sophisticated specification, the nested 
logit model, can solve some of these problems but still suffers from the IIA 
problem at each level of choice. Thus, I consider another continuous demand 
specification, which bears quite remarkable similarities to the logit model, that 
has sometimes been used for the estimation of new-product demand. 
The most widely used specification in theoretical models of product differ- 
entiation is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function used 
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The CES utility function takes the form 
(9) 
The form of the CES utility  function  makes clear that all goods are treated 
equally so that the IIA property is still present implicitly in the CES demand 
function.2y  Economic theorists have found the CES function to be analytically 
quite useful in studying product differentiation.  However, the so-called sym- 
metry  property  seems a poor  guide to empirical  reality,  where I  know  that 
Apple-Cinnamon  Cheerios are a much closer substitute to Honey-Nut Cheer- 
ios than they are to Nabisco Shredded Wheat or to Total.30 
Given the implicit IIA property of the CES model, similar to the logit model, 
it will tend to overvalue variety. This overvaluation arises because  the CES 
demand function does not recognize that some products are closer substitutes 
to other products. The CES demand function takes the form 
1 /P  2  xp 
i’  (10)  x,= [  ‘=I  ]  p,  l/(l  -PI  + E  c  py(I-P) 
(-I 
where the single parameter p estimates substitution across goods. Indeed, solv- 
ing for the cross-price elasticities from equation (1  0) yields the finding that 
29. See Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) for an insightful analysis of the similarities of 
30. The CES model has been applied to new-product introduction situations; see, eg,  Feen- 
the CES model and the logit model. 
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which demonstrates the restrictiveness of the CES demand specification. The 
equality of cross-price elasticities demonstrates that the CES demand function 
treats all goods similarly (symmetrically), and it cannot provide a reliable basis 
on which to evaluate new goods. Furthermore,  the own-price elasticities de- 
pend only on the share of the particular  good and the single parameter  p,  a 
property without any empirical foundation.” 
I now proceed to estimate the CES demand model of equation (10) using 
instrumental variables together with nonlinear least squares (NL-2SLS).  I esti- 
mate p = .580 (ASE = .00001). The estimated CES is 1/(1 -  p) = 2.13. The 
CES demand curve is plotted in figure 5.3. The virtual price is infinite, but I 
can still calculate the consumer’s surplus approximately as the area under the 
demand curve. The consumer’s surplus estimate is about three times as high as 
my previous estimate of $78.1 million per year. Thus, as I expected, the CES 
model leads to an unrealistically  high estimate of consumer welfare from a 
new-brand introduction.  Neither the CES model nor the logit model distin- 
guish sufficiently the similarities and differences among brands. Thus, a more 
flexible demand model of  the type I estimated above, which allows for an un- 
restricted pattern of own-price and cross-price elasticities at the segment level, 
appears to lead to much more realistic estimates of the virtual price and welfare 
effects of new-brand introduction. 
5.6  New-Brand Introduction with Imperfect Competition 
Up to this point I have followed the classical Hicks-Rothbarth  approach to 
the evaluation of a new product. However, the implicit assumption in that ap- 
proach that price equals marginal cost need not hold in most new-product situ- 
ations. Combined with the fact that most new-brand introductions are under- 
taken by multiproduct firms with existing competing brands, the introduction 
of imperfect competition seems necessary for a more realistic evaluation. The 
basic reason a new product may change other products’ prices is that when a 
firm solves for the profit-maximizing price of its current brands it chooses the 
price at which marginal revenue from a price increase equals marginal cost. 
When a multiproduct  firm  introduces  a new  brand,  some of  the demand it 
would lose if it attempted to raise the price of its existing brands will now be 
lost to the new brand. Thus, while multibrand firms always worry that a new 
brand  will  “cannibalize”  the demand for an  existing brand,  the new  brand 
allows the firm to raise the prices on its existing 
3 1. These properties of the own-price and cross-price elasticities are exactly analogous to the 
properties of the logit demand elasticities, cf. Hausman (1975). Thus, the IIA property holds for 
both logit models and for CES demand models. 
32. A counteracting effect can be that the new brand will cause the price of other firms’ brands 
to decrease because the new brand increases the own-price elasticity of existing brands. The com- 
plicated interactions here are currently beyond the scope of  economic theory to solve, although 
Tirole (1988) discusses many interesting examples which appear in the literature. 232  Jerry A. Hausman 
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Fig. 5.3  CES demand curve for family-segment  brands 
Once imperfect competition is allowed, the possibility of different outcomes 
becomes quite large. I adopt the most widely  used solution concept for my 
analysis, Nash-Bertrand pricing. Thus, a single-product firm is assumed to set 
the price for a given product according to the “marginal revenue equals mar- 
ginal cost” rule: 
Equation (12) is the familiar equation in which the markup of price over mar- 
ginal cost is set equal to the inverse of the magnitude of the demand elasticity. 
Now in a multiproduct-firm setting, when a firm changes the price of one good, 
it takes into account the effect on its other brands as well. Letting  IT  be the 
firm’s  profit  function,  the  first-order  conditions  for  the  multiproduct  firm 
become 
forj  = 1,. . . ,  m, 
where qk  is the demand for brand k, s,  is its share, and ekj are the cross-price 
elasticities. Thus equation (13) makes clear the dependence of a price change 
on how close a given multiproduct firm’s brands are in terms of their cross- 233  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
price elasticities. 
ear equations: 
(14)  s + E’w = 0, 
where s  is the vector of revenues shares, E is the matrix of cross-price elasticit- 
ies, and w is the vector of price/cost markups multiplied by the share (the term 
in brackets on the right-hand side of  equation [13]) which arise under the 
Nash-Bertrand assumption in equation (1 2). I solve for these individual terms 
of the markup equation by inversion of the matrix of cross elasticities: 
I now express the first-order conditions of equation (13) as a system of lin- 
(15)  w = -(E’)-ls. 
I can then use the individual elements of  w to determine the change in price 
after the new-brand introduction to the extent that marginal costs remain con- 
stant. Note that while I have derived the change in price under Nash-Bertrand 
assumptions, my analysis does not require this assumption. To the extent that 
pricing constraints will be decreased after the new  brand is introduced, the 
analysis provides a lower bound on expected price changes, absent new entry 
by competitors. 
I  now  apply  the  Nash-Bertrand  model  to  the  introduction  of  Apple- 
Cinnamon Cheerios. Remember that General Mills was already selling reg- 
ular Cheerios and Honey-Nut Cheerios when it introduced Apple-Cinnamon 
Cheerios in 1989. Thus, when deciding on a possible new brand, General Mills 
had to take into account the negative effect (“cannibalization”) that the intro- 
duction of Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios would have on the demand for its other 
brands. However, introduction of new brands also allows General Mills to price 
its existing brands higher because when it raises their prices part of the demand 
that it loses will go to the new brand, Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios. Thus, the 
welfare analysis must also be adjusted to take into account the imperfect com- 
petition which exists in the cereal market. Using the Nash-Bertrand assump- 
tion, this effect tends to lead to higher pricing for each of the other General 
Mills brands. 
Using own and cross elasticities and pound shares for General Mills brands 
in the family segment given in table 5.3, I calculate table 5.7. These calcula- 
tions are done using equations (12)-( 15), which calculate the markups over 
marginal cost that are profit maximizing for General Mills under the Nash- 
Table 5.7  Nash-Bertrand Pricing of General Mills Family-Segment Brands 
Cheerios  Honey-Nut Cheerios 
Price-cost margin  .5268  .5203 
Price-cost margin without Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios  .525 1  .5096 
Price-cost margin if brand were independent  ,5193  ,5050 234  Jerry A. Hausman 
Bertrand assumption  that other firms, such as Kellogg, will not change their 
prices in response to the introduction of Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios. The values 
from  the  first two rows  imply  a hypothetical  price  change  of  $0.0095  for 
Cheerios and $0.0787  for Honey-Nut Cheerios. The increase in the markup 
for Cheerios is only 0.32 percent while the markup for Honey-Nut Cheerios 
increases by 3.0 percent, which is expected because Apple-Cinnamon Cheer- 
ios is a closer substitute for Honey-Nut Cheerios than for regular Cheerios. 
I now account for the increase in price of  the other two Cheerios brands 
when Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios are introduced by General Mills. The average 
(per city, weekly)  pound  sales  for Cheerios  and  Honey-Nut  Cheerios  are 
93,738 and 47,215, respectively. This effect implies a first-order decrease in 
consumer’s surplus (per city, weekly) of  $890 + $3,715 = $4,605 (as com- 
pared to the $32,000-44,000  consumer’s surplus estimates). Therefore, the net 
gain in consumer’s surplus is $32,000 -  $4,605 = $27,395, or an amount 85.6 
percent as high as the Hicksian  calculation. On an annual basis the gain in 
consumer’s surplus is $66.8 million  (equivalently, $0.268 per person). Thus, 
while the gain from the new-brand introduction is still sizable, it must be ad- 
justed downward. In terms of  overall new-brand introduction, instead of the 
CPI for cereals being too high on the order of  25 percent under the perfect- 
competition assumption, the introduction of imperfect competition would re- 
duce the overstatement of the cereal CPI to about 20 percent. This amount is 
still large enough to be important and demonstrates the importance of consid- 
ering new-brand introduction in the calculation of economic welfare and con- 
sumer price indexes. 
The introduction of  imperfect  competition  in  evaluating new  goods is  a 
marked  departure  from the  classical  Hicks-Rothbarth  approach.  Imperfect 
competition brings with it supply (cost) considerations that are typically ab- 
sent from COL theory, which is typically concerned only with demand factors. 
The approach I have taken is to calculate the theoretical effect of imperfect 
competition under a particular model assumption, Nash-Bertrand competition. 
Another approach, left for future research, is to analyze the actual effect on 
prices of  the introduction of  a new brand. Data considerations do not permit 
the analysis here, because the Nielsen  data I have does not cover the period 
prior to the introduction of Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios. However, now that de- 
tailed  store-level  microdata  are available,  such a study  would be  extremely 
interesting for the current subject of welfare effects of new-product introduc- 
tion, as well  as for the broader area of competitive interaction  in industrial 
organization theory. 
5.7  Conclusion 
The correct economic approach to the evaluation  of  new goods has been 
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has not been implemented by government statistical agencies, perhaps because 
of its complications and data requirements. Data are now available. The impact 
of new goods on consumer welfare appears to be significant according to the 
demand estimates of this paper. According to the rough  calculations in this 
paper, the CPI for cereal may be too high by about 25 percent because it does 
not account for new cereal brands. An estimate this large seems worth wor- 
rying about. 
However, the classical theory propounded by Hicks leaves out an important 
potential element. In imperfect competition, which characterizes all differenti- 
ated-product industries, introduction of a new brand may permit a multiprod- 
uct firm to raise the prices of its other brands. The price increases for existing 
brands  will  decrease  the  welfare-increasing  effects  of  the  new  brand.  Ac- 
cording  to my  estimate  for the example  of  Apple-Cinnamon  Cheerios, the 
imperfect-competition  effect will reduce consumer welfare by about 15 per- 
cent compared to the perfect-competition  situation. Nevertheless, the welfare 
effect of new-brand introduction under imperfect competition is still signifi- 
cant-about  20 percent according to my rough calculations. Thus, I find that 
new-brand introduction should often be considered favorable by most econo- 
mists given its significant welfare-increasing effects. 
Why do consumers spend their income on new brands? A classical reference 
may be in order: “The love of novelty manifests itself equally in those who are 
well off and in those who are not. For . . . men get tired of  prosperity, just as 
they are afflicted by the reverse. . . .  This love of change . . . opens the way to 
every one who takes the lead in any innovation in any country” (Machiavelli, 
Discourses, chap. 21, suggested to me by Stanley Lebergott). Alternatively, I 
include the following Calvin and Hobbes cartoon in which Calvin states, “A 
big part of life is boring routine. I need more excitement. So today, I’m going 
to  have  a  new  kind  of  cereal!”  (suggested  to  me by  my  daughter  Claire 
Hausman). 
Calvin and Hobbes  by Bill Watterson 
Calvin and Hobbes 0  1995 Watterson. Distributed by Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with 
permission. All rights reserved. 236  Jerry A. Hausman 
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Comment  Timothy F.  Bresnahan 
It is easy to see that whole new industries and whole new product categories 
are economically important. They expand consumers’ range of choice in a very 
substantial way. It is harder to be sure that the steadily increasing variety  in 
many branded consumer product industries is equally important. There are a 
great many new brands, new varieties, and new packages available on the su- 
permarket  shelves. (Brandweek counted over 22,000 new-product  introduc- 
tions for 1994.) How important are these new goods individually? How large 
is their aggregate contribution to social welfare? 
Existing research has not answered this question. There is a large and stim- 
ulating theoretical literature. It treats the question of whether the market, work- 
ing through the free entry of new  products,  will supply too many  marginal 
product varieties. The purely theoretical approach is ultimately inconclusive.’ 
Empirical work has so far not pushed much further. For want of a better as- 
sumption, many policy and academic studies treat new goods as irrelevant or 
as perfect substitutes for existing goods. The official COL indexes, by linking 
in new goods only after they have been around for a while, treat them as irrele- 
vant in their early stages.2 Attempts to view  new goods as quality improve- 
ments to existing goods, for example in hedonic pricing studies, involve the 
implicit assumption of perfect substitutability. 
Each of these assumptions plausibly leads to an underestimate of the value 
Timothy E Bresnahan is professor of economics at Stanford University and a research associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
1, Eaton and Lipsey (1989) write that “in addition, the problem of optimal product diversity 
arises. . . .We showed in our discussion of that [address] model that there is no general relationship 
between product diversity in free-entry equilibrium and optimal product diversity.. . .  The awk- 
ward problem is that we do not even know the nature of  the bias-whether  there is likely to be 
too much or too little diversity in equilibrium” (760). 
2. The two problems are not unrelated. If a new good is a perfect substitute for existing goods, 
the law of one price is likely to hold. Then a delay in  linking in a new good will not make an 







Fig. 5C.l  Consumers’  gain from lowering one product’s price 
of new goods. The irrelevance assumption obviously understates the value of 
the new good, and the later the new good is incorporated, the worse the under- 
estimate. The perfect substitutability assumption is less obvious. However, ex- 
amine figure 5C.1, which I reproduce from the introduction  to this volume. 
The assumption of perfect substitutability amounts, in the figure, to assuming 
that the demand curve for a new variety is flat, like dd( -m).  If  the new good 
is in fact a less-than-perfect substitute for existing products, this ignores a con- 
sumer’s surplus triangle. The worse the substitutability, the bigger the triangle 
and therefore the underestimate. 
Following Trajtenberg (1989), Hausman takes on the question of the slope 
of  dd and the consumer’s surplus that results directly from a new good.3 He 
estimates the demand system for the RTE breakfast cereals at the level of indi- 
vidual products. The estimated demand system is used to calculate the consum- 
er’s surplus of  a single new good, Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios. 
The analysis can serve as an example of  the broader problem of  variety- 
increasing  new  products  in  branded  consumer  product  industries.  Apple- 
Cinnamon Cheerios has some nice features for this purpose. Since there are 
other cereals available, and even others that are types of Cheerios, it is clear 
that the product represents only an incremental increase in the range of choice 
at breakfast. If, as Hausman reports, it has a large value of consumer’s surplus, 
that is an important finding. In the absence of other systematic evidence about 
new product varieties (and of any particular reason to suspect RTE cereals are 
3. Trajtenberg measured the improvement in buyer welfare for a whole new class of medical 
diagnostic products, computerized tomography scanners, and for fundamental improvements in 
them, such as the “body scanner.” Trajtenberg used an “address” model of product differentiation 
like an important class in the Eaton-Lipsey survey. This led him to the conjecture that a new good’s 
distance from existing products in the address space is an important determinant of  the slope of 
dd and therefore of a product’s consumer’s surplus contribution to welfare. 239  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
much unlike other things sold in grocery stores) we should revise upward our 
assessment of the economic importance of incremental variety improvements. 
For example, existing methods for calculating price indexes for branded con- 
sumer products might be making a large error in assessing their rate of growth. 
At a minimum, accepting Hausman’s finding means we should revise upward 
the  potential  value  of  research  like  that  presented  here  for learning  about 
branded consumer product valuation in general. 
The introduction of  new goods can also change the conditions of competi- 
tion in an industry or, more simply, competitive outcomes. Existing products’ 
market power may be reduced by competition from new goods. The transitory 
monopoly accruing to a new good may be an important incentive for inventors. 
A new good may complete the product-line strategy of  an existing firm.  All 
of these issues are related to imperfect competition, Hausman’s second topic. 
Looking again at figure 5C.1, we see that a new product that generates consid- 
erable consumer’s surplus is one that has a steep demand curve. Thus, if the 
new product is supplied by only one firm, it may be associated with consider- 
able market power. The two topics of consumer’s surplus and imperfect compe- 
tition are closely linked. 
Hausman offers two main  substantive conclusions based on considerable 
econometric investigation. The consumer’s surplus associated with the intro- 
duction of Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios was substantial. Second, imperfect com- 
petition considerations mean  that the introduction tended to raise prices on 
other products, lowering the gain in consumer’s surplus but not reversing it. 
In this comment, I take up two general issues raised by Hausman’s analysis. 
First, what is the evidence for substantial consumer’s surplus gains from in- 
cremental product introductions in mature consumer-product industries? This 
question is largely econometric; the issue is the statistical finding of  a steep 
single-product demand curve in figure 5C. 1. Second, what role does imperfect 
competition play in determining the economic value of a new good? This is a 
question of economic interpretation of estimates. 
Econometric Specification and Estimation Issues 
It is natural to doubt the surprisingly large consumer’s surplus values esti- 
mated  by  Hausman.  How  can it be  true that  Apple-Cinnamon  Cheerios- 
surely a “me, too” product-is  this poor a substitute for existing products? 
Very Unrestricted  Specification 
In  my  opinion,  Hausman’s  specification decisions  are carefully  made to 
overcome skepticism on this score. -One might suspect that preexisting Cheer- 
ios products or other family-segment cereals already satisfy pretty much any 
palate. The result that there is large consumer’s surplus must arise because this 
is empirically false. Hausman finds a steep dd for Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios 
because  he  finds  relatively  poor  substitutability  between  Apple-Cinnamon 240  Jerry A. Hausman 
Cheerios and the other preexisting cereals in the family segment. What did the 
data do and what did the specification do in producing this result? Hausman is 
careful to impose very little structure on the pattern of own- and cross-price 
elasticities within segments. His estimates are very unrestrictive in this regard.4 
To be sure, Hausman does assume that products within categories are closer 
substitutes than are products in different categories. But it is not interesting to 
question whether the elasticity of substitution between two children’s cereals 
is higher than that  between  one of them and Special K. There is very little 
chance that the key assumptions are the segment separability (or “budgetabil- 
ity”) ones. We and Hausman can trust the marketing people at the RTE cereal 
companies to have done that work already. Their research is not reported to us 
in any quantitative detail, but the origin of the segmentation  assumptions  is 
surely based on the analysis of  much more detailed data than we have in this 
paper, including consumer microdata. Also, there is not a great deal of ambigu- 
ity in the segment structure.S 
At the key juncture, which because of the special structure of the cereals 
market  comes at the within-category  level, the  specification is unrestricted. 
Thus, the paper does a good job of  convincing us that the finding of  large 
consumer’s surplus is not an artifact of specification. 
Sources of Instruments 
There is another set of econometric assumptions in this (or any other) analy- 
sis of product-differentiated demand. In measuring the degree of substitutabil- 
ity among products, the econometric treatment of the endogeneity of prices is 
very important (see Berry 1994 for a recent treatment). This is the other part 
of the econometric specification of the paper where the conclusions might have 
been accidentally assumed. 
In this paper, the origins of the identifying assumptions are in a variance- 
components model of the errors. The analysis draws on the general theoreti- 
cal  results  of  Hausman  and  Taylor  (1981) for  estimation  with  variance- 
components  identification  assumptions.  In  the  present  analysis,  Hausman 
assumes that the reduced-form equation for price (his equation [  81 ), 
1%  P,,,,  = 8, 1%  c,,  + a,,, + w,,,, 
4. He also shows that a more restrictive functional form leads to a much larger estimated con- 
sumer’s surplus. 
5. In many industries, there are multiple, competing segmentation schemes that arise from the 
marketing  studies.  In automobiles,  for example,  there  are  segments (like  “subcompact”) that 
clearly matter for the structure of substitution elasticities. There is also evidence that brand names 
and even country product-quality reputations matter for the structure of elasticities of substitution. 
In many other branded consumer product markets, there is a natural question of  “private label” 
products versus brand names as well as some named segments. Thus, several principles of  differ- 
entiation, each with a distinct set of close-substitute products, compete for the analyst’s attention 
in deciding what to cluster together a priori. The comparatively simple structure of RTE cereals is 
an exception in this regard. 241  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
has a particular structure. The cost error c,,  varies with time t and good j but 
not with city n. Thus, there are common cost shocks across cities. The city- 
related but time-independent effects a,"  could be differences either in demand 
or in cost (Hausman suggests cost), but their interpretation does not matter. 
The specific identifying assumption Hausman makes is that the error w,,,  is 
uncorrelated across cities. This means that all shocks to demand over time are 
assumed to be independent across cities. 
Hausman has one and a half justifications for this assumption. eirst, it might 
really be true that there are no nationwide shocks to the demand for one brand 
of cereal relative to another. I don't  know much about RTE breakfast cereals, 
but in branded consumer product industries in general I would be very doubtful 
of  this assumption. It rules out too many important real-world  phenomena. 
For example, for Hausman's assumption to be true, there can be no successful 
nationwide  advertising  campaigns  which  shift  the  demand  for  individual 
brands or products.6 There can be no fads shifting demand temporarily  to a 
particular product, or if there are fads, they must be geographically local. There 
can be no slow acceptance of new brands. And so on. Alternatively, such com- 
mon  demand  shocks might not be  incorporated  in  prices, because  they  are 
predetermined in the relevant run (cf. the last paragraph in section 5.3). Eco- 
nomically, this is the assumption that the common demand shocks cannot be 
foreseen when prices are set. This seems unlikely as well, given the nature of 
the nationwide demand shocks just mentioned. 
If these assumptions fail, and if  supply is upward sloping, the nationwide 
demand shock will mean that the error w,,,  is correlated across cities, counter 
to Hausman's identifying as~umption.~  The interesting question is, What hap- 
pens to the finding of poor substitutability among products and therefore of a 
steep dd in figure 5C.1? 
I  examine this issue in a simple case: linear demand, Bertrand  supply by 
single-product firms, and constant marginal cost8  The demand system is 
where Q,,,, is the quantity of product j in market n at time t, y are regressors, 
and P,, are the prices of all the different products in that market at that time. 
The demand error cjnr  is assumed to have both a local and a national compo- 
nent. Finally, PI and y,  are the parameters of thejth product's demand system; 
I will use yj, to denote the own-price coefficient, and y to denote the matrix of 
6. Adding advertising stocks or flows to the demand system does not necessarily solve this 
problem. The issue of  the econometrician not observing the success of  competitive advertising 
campaigns remains. 
7. Supply could be upward sloping in the one-week run either because inventories cannot adjust 
or because of  market power. The pricing equations (13) later assumed by  Hausman imply an 
upward-sloping supply, for example. 
8. The extensions to Hausman's case of approximately log-linear demand and multiproduct firms 
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all price coefficients  in all products'  demand curves. The simplest possible 
supply  curve with  market power is the  single-product Bertrand-equilibrium 
one, assumed by almost all authors studying this problem (including Hausman 
and, here, me): 
In  the appendix,  I perform the simple algebra to get the formula for the 
asymptotic bias to Hausman's estimator. The sign and order of  magnitude of 
the bias are determined by the matrix 
CF-,,<?,[  diag ( -y)-yI-' 
Where CT-~~,  is the variance-covariance  matrix of the national portion of the 
demand shock. 
Hausman  assumes u?-,:~,  to be  all zeros, in  which  case there is no bias. 
If there are nationwide demand shocks, the own-price coefficients are biased 
upward, toward zero. This is completely intuitive and familiar; with nationwide 
demand shocks, Hausman's estimator is like doing ordinary least squares on a 
supply and demand system; of course the estimates are biased toward too-steep 
demand cur~es.~ 
Unfortunately,  this  means that y is biased  in  the direction of  the  finding 
reported by Hausman. The estimates will tend to report substitution patterns 
leading to a large consumer's  surplus for new products, not because there are 
such substitution patterns, but because there are nationwide demand  shocks 
not acknowledged in the estimation. 
To believe Hausman's finding, then, one must be prepared to assume (1) that 
there are no nationwide shocks to demand which shift consumers among the 
products within segments, or (2) that shocks are not reflected in prices because 
they are unanticipated. That is a simple matter of  econometric logic. It is a 
matter of  scholarly taste whether one is prepared to make these assumptions. 
But assuming that there are no brand-specific advertising shocks in a consumer 
product category, or that these shocks are not communicated  in advance to 
retailers, seems unwise without further investigation. 
I do not mean to imply that the research program taken up here is impos- 
sible, only that the specific econometric methodology brought to the problem 
by Hausman seems particularly inappropriate to it. There is a wide variety of 
econometric models available for estimating the degree of  substitutability in 
product-differentiated industries. I have reviewed some of them in Bresnahan 
(1 989), and many different scholars are at work advancing the methods today.'" 
9. Similarly. if less familiarly, the cross-price coefficients are also likely to be biased upward, 
though this finding depends on the covariances of  the shocks to demand across products. See 
equation Al and following text. 
10. This volume is not the place for a careful review of these methods. See Berry (1994) for a 
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Imperfect Competition 
Imperfect competition and new goods are linked through at least three major 
lines of causation. A new good in an imperfectly competitive environment can 
create market power for its inventor. It can destroy market power for competi- 
tive products. The equilibrium transitory market power these two forces imply 
contributes to the incentive to invent. 
This is an interesting  and important area of inquiry. In the paper at hand, 
“imperfect competition’’ means the analysis of a multiproduct firm with market 
power. In these remarks, I want first to point out some other useful and im- 
portant implications of these estimates, and then turn to the question of how 
general Hausman’s main analytical point might be. 
Private Return to New Goods 
A new product with a steep demand curve is involved with substantial con- 
sumer’s surplus as Hausman in his paper and Trajtenberg (1989) point out. Let 
me point out that if the new product is proprietary to a single firm, it will also 
involve a monopoly  rent to that firm.  Exactly  the  same condition  for large 
consumer’s surplus-a  not-too-flat dd in figure 5C.1-is  the condition for a 
profitable single-product  monopoly. Thus, demand measurement  papers  like 
this one are useful in assessing the private return to firms’ introduction of new 
products as well as the social return that results from the introduction, Haus- 
man’s focus. 
Of course, in the real world of multiproduct firms and competitive responses 
from other firms,  more-complex  calculations  are needed. That  is  why,  in 
this paper and others, it is valuable to estimate the entire demand system. Esti- 
mates of the  supply system, not provided here, would  obviously  be needed 
as well.” 
Prices in Imperfect Competition 
Under  imperfect competition among single-product  firms, the impact of 
new-product introductions on pricing incentives is clear. The new product low- 
ers the market power of existing products, lowering the overall level of prices.12 
This is one of the classical benefits of competition. 
With multiproduct firms, the story changes slightly. Introduction of  a new 
product by one firm lowers the market power of all other firms. This applies 
to all the other firms’ products in varying degrees, depending on the demand 
I I. Assuming that the oligopoly solution concept is known, as here it is known to be Bertrand, 
and that the slope of marginal cost is known, here known to be flat, makes estimation of the supply 
system irrelevant. All the supply parameters which are not demand parameters are assumed to 
be known. 
12. Peculiar values of  the elasticities-as  when the new good makes the demand curve for the 
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elasticities and cross e1asti~ities.l~  A new product in an imperfectly competi- 
tive industry makes demand curves at the single-product and single-firm levels 
flatter, thereby leading to a general lowering of prices. 
Why, then, does Hausman find that the prices of other products rise in re- 
sponse to an introduction? There is a two-part answer. First, he assumes that 
the prices of other firms do not change, calculating “the markups over marginal 
cost that are profit maximizing for General Mills under the Nash-Bertrand as- 
sumption that other firms, such as Kellogg, will not change their prices in re- 
sponse to the introduction of Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios” (section 5.6). This 
is a common error among those who are new to models of imperfect competi- 
tion, but an important one. The Bertrand solution concept has firms maximiz- 
ing their postentry profits, taking one another’s postentry prices as given. 
For the  analyst  to calculate  the  equilibrium  effect of  entry, however, the 
other  firms’  postentry  prices  cannot  be  taken  as  given.  The fact  of  entry 
changes the “game,” and equilibrium prices will change in response. Typically, 
they will  fall. What Hausman’s analysis does is examine the price-discrim- 
ination problem for General Mills under the assertion that it is a monopoly, 
ruling out any equilibrium competitive response from the other firms. Haus- 
man’s assertion that he has a “lower bound’ is wrong. 
This observation also clarifies the calculations Hausman actually does make. 
By holding the prices of all other firms set, he examines the pricing problem 
of a multiproduct monopolist. Will a multiproduct monopolist raise prices on 
other goods? Hausman uses equation (13),  the first-order condition for product 
j’s prices: 
The index k goes over all the firm’s other products. What happens to this ex- 
pression  if we add a new product, m  + l?  Two things:  (1) the  summation 
expression grows larger, by the term 
and (2)  the firm has a higher marginal revenue for productj because it owns 
m + 1-shares  are held constant. This is the effect emphasized by Hausman. 
13. Furthermore, under the Bertrand (Nash equilibrium with prices as strategic variables) solu- 
tion concept used by  Hausman, the story does not stop there. If a product introduction by firm A 
causes firms B and C to lower prices in response, what is the impact of those lower prices in turn? 
They represent more competition, and lower firm-B prices will cause lower firm-C prices, etc. 
Thus, the indirect effects of a competitive product introduction reinforce the direct effects. Most 
other equilibrium product-differentiated competition  theories have  similar competitive equilib- 
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The offsetting effect is that the terms s,  and s,  are smaller, to the extent that the 
existing products lose share to the new product. Thus, there are three effects 
on the existing product j’s price. First,  there is a new, positive, term  in the 
summation. Second, s,  has fallen because of cannibalization. Third, s,  falls for 
all the firms’ existing products, lowering each term in the summation. The net 
effect is to either raise or lower equation (1  3), calling for a new price of prod- 
uctj  that can be either higher or lower. 
In general, it is not possible to tell which of these effects is larger. But Haus- 
man’s assertion that we should expect one effect to dominate the other is clearly 
wrong. For the case of linear demand and a two-product firm, for example, the 
two effects exactly offset. Thus, any tendency of one effect to dominate the 
other does not arise from the fundamental economics of the problem, but in- 
stead from higher-order  derivatives. And the paper at hand contains no evi- 
dence that those are important. 
Imperfect Competition’s Implications 
Let me summarize the logical possibilities for imperfectly competitive anal- 
ysis of new goods in a simple diagram. In figure 5C.2, the columns represent 
the mechanism by  which a new good has impacts on industry pricing more 
generally, through the prices of competitive products or through the prices of 
other products of the same firm. The rows represent the welfare impacts that 
the new  good can have. I have shaded the box where Hausman focuses his 
effort. 
Effect through  Effect through 
Introducer’s Other  Competitor’s Products 
Products 
Social Return 
Inventor’s Private Return 
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It seems to me that  the focus is off. If  we agree that the  “social return” 
row is the interesting one, then Hausman has quantified the generally far less 
important effect. In general, the impact on pricing incentives for other imper- 
fect competitors must be much more important. If we look at the overall pic- 
ture, the problem involved in the conflict between incentives to introduce new 
goods and the value of those new goods looms large. And Hausman offers no 
analysis of this, though his estimates could easily be interpreted  as having a 
bearing on it. The important  topic of  imperfect  competition  and new goods 
waits for analysis. 
Conclusion 
The topic of  this paper is important for assessing the economic importance 
of  new  goods in  mature,  product-differentiated  consumer goods industries. 
This reader was, unfortunately, left unconvinced by  key econometric assump- 
tions and found the imperfect-competition  portion of the analysis off point. To 
remain unconvinced by the conclusion that single-product consumer’s surplus 
was large may simply be to believe that there are nationwide brand-name de- 
mand shocks. The puzzle of the value of this incremental product introduction 
remains unsolved. 
Appendix 
The supply and demand system for each product in each city is 
Q,,,, = YP, + P,,,Y,  + c,,,,; 
P,,,r  = Q,u,(-~,,)-l  + ~,,,r. 
Solving out the quantities leaves 
so that this equation system is the one solved by the prices of all the products 
in city n at time t: 
P,,l [I -  y diag(  -?)-I]  = (yP + cnr)  diag( --y)-’ + cnI. 
The instruments are functions  of the prices in other cities. Assume that the 
vector cnI  consists of a national variance component plus independent  draws 
for each city. Then the matrix of correlations of the prices in any particular city 
to the errors, cnl,  in any other city will be proportional to 
It is easy to see the assertions in the text in the two-product case: 247  Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
-2Y,2  + PY21  1 
-2PY22  + Y2l 
This gives the following results: 
1. The on-diagonal bias has sign (-2y,,  + p~,~),  and 
2.  The off-diagonal bias has sign (yIz -  2py,,). 
At p = 0, the on-diagonal bias has sign ( -yZ2),  that is, positive (toward zero), 
and the off-diagonal bias has sign (yI2),  that is, positive (away from zero). 
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